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INTRODUCTION
In our initial article-Shooting Down the More Guns, Less Crime
Hypothesis l-we reached two main conclusions: First, that there was no
credible statistical evidence that the adoption of concealed-carry (or "shall-
issue") laws reduced crime; and second, that the best, although admittedly quite
imperfect, data suggested that the laws increased the costs of crime to the tune
of $1 billion per year (which is a relatively small number given the total cost of
FBI index crimes of roughly $114 billion per year).2 In their response to our
article, Florenz Plassmann and John Whitley (PW) offer two sets of evidence in
support of their view that that concealed-carry laws are beneficial: First, they
argue that some of our regression specifications really buttress their position;
and second, they analyze some new county data for the period 1977-2000.
Their first method of proof fails because it simply overlooks-without
even a single word of commentary!-the entire thrust of our paper: that
aggregated specifications of the effects of these laws are badly marred by
"jurisdiction selection" effects. 3  We did not misread these aggregated
estimates, as PW suggest; we simply showed that the PW claims based on these
aggregated estimates are inaccurate and misleading. The data at every turn
reject the idea that concealed-carry laws passed in different jurisdictions have a
1. Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue I11, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less Crime"
Hypothesis, 55 STAN L. REV. 1193 (2003).
2. The average annual cost of the seven FBI Index I crimes over the 1977-1997 period
(in 1997 dollars) is $66 billion for murder; $8 billion for rape; $22 billion for aggravated
assault; $5 billion each for robbery, auto theft, and burglary; and $3 billion for larceny.
These seven individual costs sum to a total of $114 billion.
3. Selection effects can mar statistical analyses when the selected sample is taken as
representative of a larger group even though it differs systematically from the larger group.
Our paper showed that the aggregated regressions that Lott and Mustard prefer are
frequently marred because they confuse effects that apply in a few early-legalizing states
with the effects that occur in all adopting jurisdictions. Therefore, in these aggregated
regressions, there is a selection problem because some unrepresentative jurisdictions bias the
estimated effects intended to capture the effects for all jurisdictions. We refer to this
phenomenon as the "jurisdiction-selection" effect.
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uniform impact on crime. Therefore, the results of disaggregated regressions
must, counter to PW's claim, be taken as a more authoritative assessment of the
overall impact of concealed-carry laws.4
Their second method of proof fails because PW seriously miscoded their
new county dataset in ways that irretrievably undermine every original
regression result that they present in their response. As a result, the new PW
regressions must simply be disregarded. Correcting PW's empirical mistakes
once again shows that the "more guns, less crime" hypothesis is without
credible statistical support.
Amidst all the tables and figures, all the regressions and tests of statistical
significance, we strongly suspect that readers of our initial paper and the
response by PW will be confused about the seemingly contradictory findings.
Therefore, in this Reply we will try to clear away as much brush as possible to
clarify exactly where the two papers disagree. Part I of this Reply shows why
the aggregate specifications preferred by PW are infected by a jurisdictional
selection problem. Part II then shows how the more appropriate disaggregated
specifications tend to demonstrate that concealed-carry laws are associated with
higher rates of crime. Finally, Part III shows how this is all the more true if
more years of data are correctly analyzed. 5 The bottom line is that since all of
their new evidence is fatally flawed, the PW response essentially rests on
interpreting some of our aggregated regressions in a way that we extensively
argued should not be done. Since PW never respond to our arguments on this
point, we have not been moved to change any of the opinions that we
previously advanced.6
4. Not surprisingly, because of the inadequacy of these crime models, there will be
random influences that mar individual state-specific estimates. We contend that averaging
the state-specific estimates will yield a more accurate picture than the aggregated estimates
that PW prefer, since the latter have all of the defects of the state-specific estimates, but lack
the virtue of avoiding the severe selection bias.
5. Given the limited space we have been given for our Reply, we are not able to
provide a point by point refutation to all the items mentioned by PW. In a separate paper,
however, which is available on the web, we engage in a more detailed response to PW. See
Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue, Additional Comments on the Reply of Plassman and Whitley,
at http://www.law.yale.edu/ayres/.
6. We do confess error on one small point, though. We stated in a footnote that the
nightmare scenario of the unlawful shooting death of a sixteen-year-old Japanese exchange
student on his way to a Halloween party was not mentioned by Lott and Mustard. See Ayres
& Donohue, supra note 1, at 1200 n. 12. We should have said that, although they mentioned
the incident in passing, Lott and Mustard inaccurately stated that the killing was not found to
be "unlawful." See John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-
Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1997). Although the killer was not
convicted of criminal homicide in that case, he was deemed to have acted tortiously and a
substantial civil judgment was levied against him, as our footnote 12 noted. Ayres &
Donohue, supra note 1, at 1200 n. 12. Hence, the shooting was indeed "unlawful." Although
we had actually pointed this out to John Lott prior to the publication of the original Lott and
Mustard paper, the error was not corrected.
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It is important to note that what we now refer to as the PW response has
already been widely circulated as a draft, whose first author is John Lott.7
Moreover, Lott has repeatedly told the press and/or published to the Internet
that Ayres and Donohue have simply misread their own results. 8 But after
seeing this Reply to the original Lott, Plassmann, and Whitley paper, Lott
asked the Stanford Law Review to take his name off the work. We hope that
this indicates that the arguments in our Reply have caused the primary
proponent of the more guns, less crime hypothesis to at least partially amend
his views. We note that to this day, legislators are still voting for the adoption
of concealed-carry laws while citing Lott's work.9
I. THE DATA STRONGLY REJECT AGGREGATE SPECIFICATIONS
Our initial paper provided three strong indications why states were likely to
have very divergent impacts from passing the shall-issue law. First, a simple
inspection of graphs suggested that states who by happenstance passed the law
in the mid-eighties were likely to show a more beneficial impact from the law
than states that passed the law later in the nineties. Second, one sees very
different results if one looks at the early adopters versus those adopting after
1991. If one runs either the basic aggregated regressions on the period from
1991-1999 (AD1 0 tables 411) or the same regression over the full period while
simply dropping the early-passing states (as we discuss below), one sees a
dramatically more deleterious impact of the law. Third, the wild gyrations in
aggregate year-by-year impacts of the law as the composition of covered states
changes suggests markedly different jurisdiction-specific impacts that should
be controlled for by a more disaggregated regression specification.
The raw crime data do not support a claim that crime fell more in states
adopting concealed-carry laws. Although our initial paper presents results
from over 700 regressions, an important part of the story comes through in just
a few pictures. Even a quick examination of our initial AD figures I a through
If' 2 shows that, for every crime category, the period from 1985 to 1992 was a
7 . The paper with Lott as first author is still online on both SSRN, at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=37231 as well as the American
Enterprise Institute website. The SSRN abstract of this paper had been viewed 5748 times as
of April 14, 2003.
8. See http://www.wmsa.net/news/LATimes/lat-030123 donohue v lott.htm.
9. Bill Bell Jr., Concealed Weapons Bill Gets OK from Senate Panel, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 2003 (noting that a bill that would let qualified people carry concealed
weapons in Missouri that passed the Missouri House in March was just endorsed by a Senate
committee, sending it to the full Missouri Senate).
10. To help readers identify the appropriate tables and figures, we will add "AD" and
"PW" prefixes to refer to tables and figures from the original Ayres & Donohue paper and
the Plassmann and Whitley response in this Issue, respectively.
11. See Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1232-33 tbls.4a-4b.
12. See id. at 1208-13 figs.la-lf.
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bad spell. During this period crime was rising very rapidly, and, particularly
for murder, this increase was noticeably greater for the states that never
adopted concealed-carry laws. Lott and Mustard's analysis has used statistical
models to argue that the greater crime increases of the nonadopting states in
this period resulted from their failure to adopt concealed-carry laws. Indeed,
they emphasize that others who have looked at the data over this same period
have also found that the nonadopting states had greater crime increases than the
adopting states. 13 However, the story changes after 1992. Crime starts falling
everywhere, and it falls even more in the nonadopting states than in the
adopting states. This is inconvenient for the Lott and Mustard hypothesis. We
have argued that the initial Lott and Mustard study-relying on data that ended
in 1992-only came to the conclusion that it did because the immense crack-
induced crime epidemic of the late 1980s hit states with large urban centers
harder than the more rural, more Republican states that adopted concealed-
carry laws during this period. When the crack problem subsided, the
nonadopting states, which had previously looked bad relative to the adopters,
began looking much better. In the early 1990s, violent crime was substantially
lower in the eight states that adopted concealed-carry laws in the 1980s than in
the twenty-two states that had never adopted these laws (except for rape, which
was about the same in the two sets of states in the early 1990s). By the end of
the 1990s, violent crime was at the same level or lower in the twenty-two
nonadopting states (and substantially lower for rape). We suspect that most
independent scholars will now realize that the Lott and Mustard 1977-1992
regression results suffered from serious omitted-variable bias, and that it was
this bias that drove Lott and Mustard's initial findings.
Looking over the entire period from 1977 to 1999, crime fell more in states
that did not adopt concealed-carry laws than in states that did. This is true for
13. While PW contend that "most studies" have supported their work, it should be
noted that they (including original author John Lott) and David Mustard wrote 5 of the 10
supporting studies that they cite in their first footnote. See Florenz Plassmann & John
Whitley, Confirming More Guns, Less Crime, 55 STAN. L. REV 1315 n.l (2003). Of the
remaining five studies, the author of one-Michael Maltz-strongly insists that there is no
credible evidence to support the more guns, less crime thesis, Email from Michael Maltz,
Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, to John
Donohue, Professor, Stanford Law School (Jan. 19, 2003); see also infra note 48, and the
other three studies look only at the period through 1992 and/or use only the aggregated
models that we show to be problematic. Moreover, a sizeable array of other studies has also
raised considerable doubts about the more guns, less crime hypothesis. We cited five of
them in footnote 3 of our article, but there are others and more on the way. The latest of
which we are aware is Tomislav V. Kovandzic & Thomas B. Marvell, Right-to-Carry
Concealed Handguns and Violent Crime: Crime Control Through Gun Decontrol?
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/ paper.tafabstractid=321820.
This paper uses panel data for 58 Florida counties from 1980 to 2000 to examine the effects
on violent crime from increases in the number of people with concealed-carry permits, rather
than relying purely on a dummy measuring the presence of a concealed-carry law. The
authors "find little evidence that the law reduces or increases violent crime." Jd. at 2.
1375
HeinOnline -- 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1375 2002-2003
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
every crime category, except murder where there was essentially no difference
in the change in crime rates in adopting and nonadopting states. 14
Using aggregate regressions, the estimated effect of concealed-carry laws
in later-adopting states suggests a highly deleterious impact. To confirm that
the early legalizers look very different from the late adopters, we reran our
original AD table 3,15 which presents the basic aggregated regressions that PW
favor, while simply dropping out the early legalizers from the analysis (states
adopting concealed-carry laws prior to 1992). If concealed-carry laws really
did have the crime-reducing effect that they claim, it should show up when we
simply drop out the pre-1992 early legalizers (a total of eleven jurisdictions
under Vernick's coding and twelve under Lott's coding). 16
However, doing so for the state data with and without state fixed trends-
which we present as Table 1 in this Reply' 7-reveals overwhelmingly positive
coefficients suggesting large and statistically significant increases in crime. It
would be hard to find a set of regression results that were less supportive of the
more guns, less crime hypothesis. All the evidence correlates concealed-carry
laws adopted after 1991 with higher rates of crime. Of course, the positive
estimates are probably unrealistically large in these modified regressions for the
same reason that unrealistically large negative coefficients were obtained by
Lott and Mustard in their original analyses that ended in 1992: Nonpassing
states in the early period had a bigger run-up in crime induced by the problem
of crack, which made the adopting states look good by comparison, but when
crime started falling in the 1990s, it fell more in the nonadopting crack-plagued
states, making the adopting states of the 1990s look worse than they probably
really were.
14. See Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1208-13 figs.la-lf (presenting a simple
panel data model with state and year fixed effects and no other explanatory variables); id. at
1331 tbl. I (line 2) (same).
15. See id at 1228-29 tbls.3a-3b.
16. Thomas Marvell has also pointed out that he has some disagreements with both
Lott's and Vernick's coding of the dates of passage of concealed-carry laws for six states.
He indicates that the proper dates for these six are: Louisiana (1996), Maine (1980), New
Hampshire (1994), Texas (1995), Utah (1995), and West Virginia (1988). Email from
Thomas Marvell, Justec Research, to John Donohue, Professor, Stanford Law School (Mar.
5, 2003). Moreover, Marvell states that neither North Dakota nor Indiana has a true shall-
issue law, since both laws allow for discretionary refusals to award concealed-carry permits.
Id Fortunately, the various different codings of dates of adoption of the concealed-carry
laws seem not to heavily influence any of the findings.
17. See infra tbl. 1.
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In light of the evidence that aggregated regressions of the type that Lott
and Mustard favor yield estimates that the concealed-carry laws
overwhelmingly increased crime for states adopting after 1991 (when we
simply drop the pre-1992 adopters), PW will have to take their choice: Either
the differences are real, in which case the post-1991 concealed-carry laws are
driving up crime, or they are spurious, resulting from the influence of crack or
some other extraneous factor that remains uncontrolled-for in their models. In
either event, we have further support for the view that the aggregated results are
improperly combining very different estimated effects across the adopting
states (and perhaps more evidence that crack cocaine drives the ostensible
declines in crime in the early legalizing states).
The serious selection effect occurs in the aggregated models because in the
first few years after adoption all adopting states enter into the estimated effect
of the law, but successively fewer states enter into the longer term effects; steps
that address the selection effect problem invariably undermine the Lott and
Mustard hypothesis. The serious flaw in the aggregated estimates of the effect
of concealed handguns using the Lott and Mustard-type regressions can be seen
by examining the year-by-year estimates of the effects of concealed-carry laws
in AD figures 3a through 3i.18 These figures essentially highlight a twelve-
year period extending from eight years prior to adoption to three years after
adoption for which relatively complete data is available for all of the states
adopting concealed-carry laws.19 Looking at that period for all nine crime
categories leaves one with no reason to think that these state laws lowered
crime.
Three full calendar years after adoption, visual inspection suggests two
pattems: First, for murder, robbery, property crime, auto theft, burglary, and
larceny, crime is above the prepassage low that occurred two or three years
prior to adoption (suggesting only a reversion-to-the-mean phenomenon);2 0 and
18. See Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1246-54 figs.3a-3i. The year-by-year
estimates are temporally disaggregated and allow the data to choose the yearly pre- and
postadoption crime patterns controlling for state- and year-fixed effects, rather than imposing
the greater structure of the dummy-variable, spline, or hybrid models. All four of these
approaches assume that the response to the law is identical for each adopting jurisdiction-
the jurisdictional-aggregation assumption-which leads to only a single estimated effect
across all jurisdictions (at any point in time). This assumption is rejected by standard
statistical tests, which explains why the state-specific estimates vary so much across
jurisdictions and why jurisdictional aggregation can be so problematic when not all states
influence a particular estimated effect at a certain point in time (the selection effect
problem).
19. We have complete data for all adopting jurisdictions over the period eight years
before to three years after adoption with only one exception-there is no data for Maine in
the period from eight to five years prior to adoption using Vernick's coding of the date of
adoption of the concealed-carry law. If we do not use Vemick's coding, though, we have
complete data for all adopting jurisdictions over that entire period.
20. PW properly consider crime rates that merely return "to their prelaw lows" to be
evidence of mean reversion. See Plassmann & Whitley, supra note 13, at 1352. For murder
1379
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second, for violent crime, rape, and aggravated assault, crime simply continues
along a prepassage trend, suggesting no effect. Outside the bolded portion of
these figures, one sees unreliable movements in the estimated effects from
which PW try to tell a story of law-induced drops in crime. Rather than
providing useful information about the impact of these laws, these unreliable
movements are the product of selection effects as later-adopting states
increasingly drop out of the postpassage estimates (as shown in AD table 721).
The wild gyrations in the year-by-year estimates in the later years are
solely the product of the changing mix of states being tested. The reported
results for eleven or more years after passage include only Maine, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Florida. The main payoff of these graphs is
again just to show that any aggregated analysis is flawed. Disaggregated (state
specific) analysis is necessary to see the real variation in crime that the data are
trying to imperfectly reflect in the aggregated year-specfic analysis. To control
for this jurisdiction-selection effect in a more systematic way than our visual
inspection of AD figure 3, we ran a regression that limits the estimate of the
effect of the law to the period with the most complete data from eight years
prior to three years after adoption. When this is done, the concealed-carry laws
lead to increases (or no effect) in violent crime, murder, robbery, property
crime, auto theft, burglary, and larceny. No clear picture emerges of the effect
on the other two crimes (rape and aggravated assault) since some models
predict increases or no effect, and others predict decreases. 22
PW point to our initial AD figures 3a 23 (robbery) and 3b24 (murder) as
evidencing a drop in crime induced by the adoption of concealed-carry laws,
and completely ignore our argument that the apparent drop is purely the
product of a selection effect. This is remarkable in that one usually expects a
response to address the main arguments of the original paper, but even more so
because of their one-sided invocation of the selection-effect problem.
Specifically, they explicitly try to take advantage of the selection effect to
argue that the ostensible jump in the murder rate after thirteen years should not
be taken as evidence against their thesis. Referencing this upward jump, they
state:
The increase between years thirteen and fourteen is ... more apparent than
real. The real "increase" is actually not due to any sudden change in Maine's
crime rates, but to the fact that other states are included in calculating the
crime rate for year thirteen, while only Maine is used for year fourteen. 25
and robbery, the reversion is incomplete since after three years crime remained above the
low in the three years prior to adoption.
21. Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1242 tbl.7.
22. See id. at 1243-44 tbls.8a-8b.
23. Id. at 1246 fig.3a.
24. Id. at 1247 fig.3b.
25. Plassmann & Whitley, supra note 13, at 1321.
[Vol. 55:13711380
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The specific point that PW make is wrong in that Maine is not the sole
state until the fifteenth year. In year fourteen Maine, North Dakota, and South
Dakota all influence the estimated effect of the law. The general point they
make, however, is correct, although they utterly fail to understand its
importance. The selective dropping out of states from the estimated effect of
the law generates all of the ostensible crime drop that they cheer for years four
through thirteen (after adoption). To repeat their phrase, this effect is "more
apparent than real.' '26 In their part I.C, they also try to credit the out-year data
as evidence of a drop in rape and aggravated assault, but the same selection
effect argument undermines this attempt. We would suggest that PW take
another look at two tables in our original paper: AD table 7,27 which illustrates
how the sample of states driving the aggregated estimated effects shrinks
dramatically four years after adoption; and AD table 8,28 which shows that
when one looks at the period of most complete data from eight years before
passage to three years after passage, there is considerable evidence of crime
increase and no robust evidence of any decline associated with the adoption of
a concealed-carry law. 29
This same jurisdictional-selection effect mars all of the aggregate
regression specifications. While the aggregated results (found either in AD
tables 10 and 1 1 for county data or AD table 3 for state data 30) may appear
superficially supportive of the Lott and Mustard thesis in that murder, rape,
robbery, and burglary seem to be dropping with the passage of the law (even as
property crimes are rising), they are similarly the product of the serious
jurisdiction-selection-effect problem that marred the AD table 3 results: 3 1
Once the late-adopting states drop out of the aggregated estimates, one is no
longer comparing a consistent set of states across time.
26. Id.
27. See Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1242 tbl.7.
28. See id at 1243-44 tbls.8a-8b.
29. Of course, this is the answer to all of their claims in their part I.D. The (temporally
disaggregated but jurisdictionally aggregated) year-by-year breakdown-which they assert
provides "a much more accurate picture of changing crime patterns"--actually shows why
all the jurisdictionally aggregated models they rely on so heavily are misspecified. It is not,
as PW figure 2 suggests, that crime is dropping so sharply a number of years after passage,
making a linear approximation inappropriate. It is because the selection effect of states
dropping out of the aggregated estimated effect of the law leads to the misspecification. See
Plassmann & Whitley, supra note 13, at 1326-29. Once again, AD table 8 provides the
evidence on the most consistent data comparing all states over the four years prior to passage
and the three years after (and only missing Maine for the period from minus eight to minus
five), and the evidence for the more guns, less crime theory evaporates when apples and
apples are being compared. See Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1243-44 tbls.8a-8b.
Note that another way to address the selection-effect problem is to look at the state-specific
estimates, which again suggest the laws predominantly increase crime.
30. See Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1228-29 tbls.3a-3b, 1262 tbl.10, 1269
tbl. 11.
31. Id. at 1228-29 tbls.3a-3b.
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But even if PW were correct in ignoring the importance of this selection-
effect problem, the year-by-year analysis would still not provide solid support
for the more guns, less crime hypothesis. Indeed, the picture that PW paint of
falling crime many years after adoption of concealed-carry laws is not
supported for four out of five violent crimes when the year-by-year estimates
are generated while controlling for preexisting state crime trends. To see this,
Figures 1 a through I e of this Reply 32 recreate the five violent crime graphs of
AD figure 3,33 while superimposing the year-by-year estimates that emerge
when we control for state trends. The first thing to note is that when one looks
at the period of most complete data (from eight years prior to three years after
adoption of the concealed-carry laws), controlling for state trends yields results
that are either similar to the results without such controls or further strengthen
the case against the more guns, less crime hypothesis. Second, even if one
ignores the selection-effect problem by relying on the results beyond three
years after adoption, as PW do, the year-by-year estimates show violent crime
increases in four out of five cases when controlling for state trends.
Specifically, violent crime, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery show no sign
of the drop in crime that PW emphasize. 34 Do these results signal massive
increases in violent crime in the wake of adoption of concealed-carry laws?
Although the logic of PW's analysis would dictate this conclusion, we would
caution against that interpretation in light of the selection-effect problem.
Instead, the first point seems sounder: Controlling for state trends provides
further ammunition against the more guns, less crime hypothesis over the
period from eight years prior to three years after adoption of concealed-carry
laws.
In sum, there are many reasons to be skeptical of the PW assumption that
concealed-carry laws had an identical (dampening) effect on crime in every
adopting jurisdiction. A simple inspection of graphs charting crime across
time, our regressions excluding early adopters or limiting the analysis to the
1991-1999 period, and our year-by-year regressions all led us to conclude that
modeling an aggregate state effect was inappropriate. The natural response is
to estimate a less-constrained specification that allows the regression to test for
state-specific impacts.
32. See infra figs. la-1f.
33. Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1246-54 figs.3a-3i.
34. The ostensible drop in crime beyond the third full year after adoption appears
stronger for murder when controlling for state trends, as shown in Figure lb. The bottom
line is that the year-by-year results that PW trumpet are not robust to the inclusion of state
trends. If state trends should be included in the analysis, then either concealed-carry laws
increase every violent crime except murder, or the statistical models are generating spurious
results (perhaps because of the omitted variable problem of crack, which had a greater
impact on murder than any other crime). Thus, the potentially most unreliable result is the
only one (of five) that supports the PW thesis.
[Vol. 55:13711382
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1I. THE DISAGGREGATED REGRESSIONS SHOW THAT
CONCEALED-CARRY LAWS TEND TO INCREASE CRIME
We did just this: We ran regressions on the less-constrained state-specific
hybrid model. This jurisdictionally disaggregated model massively rejected the
Lott and Mustard assumption of a uniform effect of the law across all states. 35
To be specific, standard statistical tests (measuring the better fit of the less-
constrained disaggregated regressions) formally rejected the aggregate
specifications in AD tables 10 and 11 36 that Lott and Mustard prefer.
Therefore, it is more appropriate to rely on the regressions estimating the more
general state-specific estimates (AD tables 12 and 13 37 ). 38 These
disaggregated regressions directly solve the jurisdiction selection problem
because they do not attempt to combine the diverging impacts of different
jurisdictions into a single estimate of the law's impact.
When we estimated these state-specific effects, we found substantially less
support for PW's crime-reduction hypothesis. For every crime category,
substantially more of the resulting state-specific estimates show estimated
increases in crime following the adoption of these laws than show decreases
(and the disparity is even greater if one limits the analysis to statistically
significant estimates). Moreover, when these state-specific county estimates
35. PW do attempt to provide state-specific estimates, although they use a linear-spline
model, rather than our less constrained hybrid model. Since our statistical tests rejected this
model, we found this choice puzzling. However, as we discuss below, they misdefined some
of their variables, which distorted all of their own regressions, so their claims about their
state-specific spline models should be ignored (at least until all their errors are corrected).
36. Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1262 tbl.10, 1269 tbl.1 1.
37. Id. at 1272 tbl.12, 1279 tbl.13.
38. This jurisdictional-selection-effect problem undermines their similar PW tables 1
and 2 analyses. See Plassmann & Whitley, supra note 13, at 1331-32 tbls.1-2. For example,
PW table 1 averages the monetary impact of five different now-discredited aggregate
specifications together with two preferable state-specific specifications. Id. at 1331 tbl.l.
Nonetheless, PW seem to think that all seven estimates (the five aggregated estimates that
we have rejected as well as the two disaggregated state-specific estimates that we prefer) are
equally valid, which leads them to take the average of the seven estimates (four of which
show crime decreases and three of which show crime increases). We could hardly agree
with this approach for all the reasons we have set forth in our paper. If one has five
unreliable estimates and two better ones, is it really good practice to take the average of all
seven numbers as your best estimate? The bottom line is that four of the five aggregated
estimates show declines in crime, while the two state-specific estimates that avoid the
problems of the aggregated models show increases in crime of over $1 billion per year.
Until PW can convince us why we should give equal weight to statistical models that are
rejected by standard statistical tests and that show obvious signs of misspecification because
of the serious selection effects as states drop out of the postpassage estimates, we simply
have no reason to average across the seven estimates. The two state-specific estimates both
show that concealed-carry laws are associated with increased crime, and these estimates are
clearly preferable to the flawed aggregated estimates.
1388 [Vol. 55:1371
HeinOnline -- 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1388 2002-2003
Apr. 2003] LA TEST "MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME" MISFIRES
are converted into dollar values (AD table 1439), the effect of adoption of
concealed-carry laws using our preferred hybrid model is to increase the
overall cost of crime by roughly $1 billion (AD table 1540).
PW suggest that our disaggregated hybrid model may be misspecified if
there is a downward curve in crime rates following adoption of concealed-carry
laws.4 1 Ironically, this problem would be, if anything, more severe for their
spline specification, as opposed to our less-constrained hybrid specification.
But the correct response to the potential problem of fitting a line to a curve is
not to assume away the problem by fiat (by constraining the direct effect to be
zero, as their spline model does), but rather to .go to a less-constrained
specification and let the data tell us whether the implicit constraints of the
linear hybrid specification are rejected. The natural next step.is a second-order
hybrid specification, which estimates a direct/dummy, linear/spline, and
quadratic/spline effect. We already did this in our original paper. In footnote
107, we discussed a quadratic-hybrid regression that we ran to test whether the
constraints of the linear hybrid were legitimate, stating:
It is possible, of course, to estimate even less-constrained specifications that
admit the possibility of higher order impacts. Indeed, we estimated a
disaggregated quadratic hybrid that is identical to the disaggregated hybrid
discussed above but which includes a prepassage quadratic term and a
postpassage quadratic spline term. Estimating this quadratic-hybrid
specification allowed us to test (1) whether the implicit restrictions of the
(linear) hybrid are rejected by the less-constrained specification, and (2)
whether the results of the (linear) hybrid were robust to the less-constrained
specification. We found that the (linear) hybrid's implicit assumption of no
quadratic postpassage effect was not decisively rejected in that only 49 of the
216 coefficients were statistically different from zero (although the quadratic
spline effects were jointly different from zero in eight of the nine regressions).
But the basic results of the (linear) hybrid analysis discussed in the text remain
unaltered: Calculating the net annualized five-year impact, we continued to
find that the vast majority of the statistically significant impacts were positive
(48 versus 20).42
In other words, our state-specific county data model (with Lott's coding of
the concealed-carry jurisdictions) continues to show substantially more
statistically significant increases in crime than decreases when a quadratic-
hybrid model is used. Since our above-quoted footnote discussion on this point
seems not to have been adequate, we present more details of this approach in
Table 2 43 below. 44 As the Table reveals, four states show a statistically
39. Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1282 tbl.14.
40. Id. at 1285 tbl.15.
41. See Plassmann & Whitley, supra note 13, at 1328 fig.2.
42. Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1280 n.107.
43. See infra tbl.2.
44. Table 2 indicates that 22.7% of the postpassage quadratic effects were statistically
significant, although only 6.9% of the postpassage quadratic effects had negative statistically
1389
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significant increase in violent crime while only two show a statistically
significant decrease; five states show a statistically significant increase in
murder, while only one state shows a statistically significant decline. In fact,
every crime category of this quadratic-hybrid specification shows more positive
than negative five-year impacts. Moreover, the population-weighted average of
the crime effects for the twenty-four jurisdictions is uniformly positive. In
particular, the annualized five-year impact of the law was a 3.7% increase for
violent crime, and a 7.7% increase for murder.45
When we tally up the estimated annualized dollar impact of the law on
crime (as we did in our original AD table 1446), we find that moving to this
less-constrained quadratic-hybrid specification increases the estimate of the
harm associated with adoption of concealed-carry laws. AD table 14, using the
linear-hybrid specification, estimated that concealed-carry laws had increased
the cost of crime in the passing states on an annualized basis of roughly a
billion dollars. However, Table 2 here almost doubles this amount, suggesting
that concealed-carry laws increase crime costs annually by $1.97 billion. 47
Thus, while we are not sure that the quadratic-hybrid is an improvement over
the linear-hybrid state-specific models (since the constraints of the latter model
were not strongly rejected), the use of the quadratic-hybrid model responds to
the PW claims of linear-hybrid misspecification and provides even stronger
evidence against the more guns, less crime hypothesis.
significant curvature of the kind that PW posited in PW figure 2. Plassmann & Whitley,
supra note 13, at 1328 fig.2. Even after we allow the data to choose the degree of curvature,
we still find positive and statistically significant direct effects for 10.6% of postpassage
direct effects (23/216).
45. See infra tbl.2.
46. Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1282 tbl.14.
47. Paralleling AD table 15, id. at 1285 tbl.15, the estimate of increased crime persists
regardless of the significance filter we impose: no filtering, $1.9 billion; 10%, $1.4 billion;
5%, $945 million; and 1%, $796 million.
1390 [Vol. 55:1371
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TABLE 2: THE JURISDICTION-SPECIFIC ANNUALIZED FIVE-YEAR IMPACT OF
SHALL-ISSUE LAWS ON CRIME, QUADRATIC HYBRID MODEL
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-30.8% -30.6% -12.0% -5.1% -22.5% -11.9%
-16.8% -30.5% -10.3% -32.3% -40.2% -12.9%
5.9% 0.9% 1.3% -15.9% 4.1% 0.3%
-17.5% -82.3% -45.6% -49.2% -56.4% -41.8%
-9.1% 15.4% 9.6% 4.6% 3.0% 11.8%
78.2% 6.1% 71.6% 57.3% 55.2% 16.9%
76.1% -7.2% 16.6% 23.8% 16.4% 16.2%
23.1% 47.6% 8.6% 30.2% 2.4% 9.3%
37.7% 16.6% 48.4% 48.2% 36.3% 45.5%
14.8% -16.50 10.9% -15.2% 6.1% 13.40
69.0% -37.1% 22.1% 16.9% 26.1% 25.3%
30.5% 8.3% 72.0% 41.6% 44.7% 22.8%
12,5% 37.4% 25.8% -6.5% 36.1% 32.1%
-16.7% 15.4% -1.1% 18.1% 5.2% -6.8%
42.0% 22.4% 9.1% 34.6% 2.5% 9.3%
41.8% 34.6% -15.3% 11.8% 29.9% 10.4%
-41.4% 7.9% -14.3% 6.1% 20.9% -14.1%
4.5% -6.1% -46.5% 11.9% -26.6% -8.2%
-28.3% 54.4% 7.4% 66.6% 35.3% 32.5%
-6.0% 25.5% 12.8% 33.6% 44.0% 8.4%
61.5% 98.2% 16.2% 45.4% 41.5% 28.8%
7.1% 21.4% -10.2% 5.6% -14.7% -13.7%
-5.7% 15.6% -2.6% -1.0% 3.7% -3.0%

























Weighted Average Effect: 3.7% 7.7% 0.3% 0.6% 5.2% 0. 1% 7. 1% 5.0% 2.5%
Summary of Five-Year Effects Totals
Negative & significant 2 1 2 1 2 3 3 4 2 20
Negative & not significant 7 6 9 8 6 6 4 2 6 54
Positive & not significant 11 12 11 9 10 8 11 12 10 94
Positive & significant 4 5 2 6 6 7 6 6 6 48
Percentage of Significant After and Before Squared Coefficients Totals
After' 20.8% 4.2% 29.2% 20.8% 25.0% 33.3% 33.3% 25.0% 12.5% 22.7%
Before2  50.0% 33.3% 37.5% 41.7% 41.7% 58.3% 58.3% 58.3% 41.7% 46.8%
Total after' and before2  35.4% 18.8% 33.3% 31.3% 33.3% 45.8% 45.8% 41.7% 27.1% 34.7%
Percentane of Positive and Significant Intercept. Linear, and Ouadratic Terms Totals
DAmmy (intercept effect) . 8.3% 16.7% 12.5% 8.3% 4.2% 12.5% 16.7% 12.5% 4.20% 10.6%
After (linear effect) 125% 8.3% 4.2% 16.7% 4.2% 16.7% 16.7% 8.% 208% 12.0%
After2 (quadratic effect) 20.8% 0.0% 20.8% 16.7% 20.8% 12.5% 25.0% 20.8% 4.2% 15.7%
Notes: Weighted Average Effect is calculated by weighting the state-specific coefficients by their average population
over the time period. The dependent variable is the In(crime rate) named at the top of each column. The data set is
comprised of annual county-level observations. County- and year- fixed effects are included in all specifications. All
regressions are weighted by county population. Coefficients that are significant at the .10 level are underlined.
Coefficients that are significant at the .05 level are displayed in bold. Coefficients that are significant at the .01 level
are both underlined and displayed in bold.
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II. THE PW REGRESSIONS ON THE NEW COUNTY DATASET
ARE ALL FATALLY FLAWED BY SERIOUS CODING PROBLEMS
PW emphasize a series of regressions run on a new county dataset that
extends the data series substantially further forward to the year 2000. They
argue, in sharp contrast to our article, that adding even more data buttresses the
crime-reduction hypothesis. But, putting aside lingering concerns we have with
the new county data,4 8 there are reasons to be immediately suspicious about the
claim that PW make in their response that adding more years of data would
strengthen the more guns, less crime hypothesis. As our original AD tables la
through 1 P9 showed, crime tended to drop more in the nonadopting states in
the 1990s than in adopting states, and regressions run only on the data from
1991 through 1999 found that the vast bulk of the coefficients were positive
(although only the effects for property crimes were statistically significant 50).
48. Following Michael Maltz, we have been concerned about relying on any analysis
that uses county crime data, particularly if the data extends across the period before and after
1993 (when the reporting agency substantially changed its data collection method). See id
at 1260. But PW claim that we have misread Maltz, and that Maltz did not assert that
reliance on the county dataset was unwise. Both claims are false. Indeed, we showed our
statement and the PW response to Michael Maltz, and he rejected the PW allegation. Maltz
said that, if anything, our paper actually understated the Maltz and Targonski criticism of the
county-level data: They view the county data to be severely flawed overall, "especially if'
(not "only if") one extends the data across the break in the series that occurred in 1994.
Email from Michael Maltz to John Donohue, supra note 13. In response to PW's claim that
the measurement problems are no worse in the county data than in the state data, Maltz
replies: "[B]oth state- and county-level data are affected, but state-level data are affected
much less profoundly." Id.
PW also contend that Maltz and Targonski have "no discussion of a post-1992 break in
the quality of data." Plassmann & Whitley, supra note 13, at 1363. Maltz again disagrees:
We noted:
The 1994 NACJD codebook (ICPSR dataset 6669) explicitly notes this in a major
heading, "Break in Series," and describes the new imputation procedure it began using
in 1994. It goes on to state,
These changes will result in a break in series from previous UCR county-level
files. Consequently data from earlier year files should not be compared to data
from 1994 and subsequent years because changes in procedures used to adjust for
incomplete reporting at the ORI or jurisdiction level may be expected to have an
impact on aggregates for counties in which some ORls have not reported for all
12 months.
Email from Michael Maltz to John Donohue, supra note 13. "In other words," Maltz
continues, "Lott refuses to acknowledge that his entire county-level analysis in the second
edition of his book is faulty." Id. In response to the PW statement-"[n]or do Maltz and
Targonski provide any evidence that state-level data are more dependable than county-level
data," Plassmann & Whitley, supra note 13, at 1363-Maltz replies: "We do so in our
response to his response to our paper." Email from Michael Maltz to John Donohue, supra
note 13. At the least it must be conceded that there is no truth to the PW claim that we
misinterpreted Maltz's views.
49. Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1208-13 figs.la-lf.
50. See id at 1332-33 tbls.4a-4b.
1392 [Vol. 55:1371
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Thus, one would normally expect that adding more data would weaken the Lott
and Mustard findings rather than strengthen them as PW contend in their
response. This puzzle was resolved when John Lott gave us the data that were
used for the response to our paper (recall that Lott was initially the lead author
of that response). We found that this dataset contained numerous coding errors,
which we describe below. Correcting these errors, which contaminated every
regression that was run for their response to our paper, had a profound effect on
their estimates and restored the conclusion that concealed-carry laws were
associated with increases in crime (or no effect) for all crime categories.
Note that the new regressions presented by PW differ from ours in two
main ways. First, they extend their county data to the year 2000. Second, they
control for region-year effects (as opposed to a uniform national fixed effect).
To illustrate the nature of the errors we found in their data and the importance
of these errors to their results, first consider their PW table 3a, 5 1 which presents
the estimated impact of concealed-carry laws on crime using the dummy,
spline, and hybrid models on their expanded county dataset. (This is their very
first table presenting new regression evidence.) Unfortunately, PW miscoded
many of the region-year dummies. For example, for Pennsylvania in 1997-
2000, no region-year dummies were assigned. 52 When we corrected this
mistake and others like it, 53 the results were completely reversed. For example,
the top panel of Table 354 shows our replication of PW table 3a. Note that for
the dummy-variable model, they find that murder, rape, and robbery all show
51. Plassmann & Whitley, supra note 13, at 1345 tbl.3a.
52. In the PW dataset, there is a variable called NE trend that is used to generate the
region-year effects for every county in the northeast region, which includes Pennsylvania.
For every county in that region, the crime rate observation is assigned an NE trend value for
the particular year, which would be 1990 in the year 1990, 1991 in the following year, etc.
For Pennsylvania, the NE trend variable shows zero for each year from 1997 through 2000,
which essentially knocks out the region-year dummy for all the Pennsylvania counties for
that four-year period. Thus, the NE trend value for the Pennsylvania counties drops down
from 1996 in 1996 to zero in the next four years.
53. For 1999 and 2000, Alaska's region-year dummies had errors similar to
Pennsylvania's. Moreover, Hawaii was excluded from all five of the regions used in their
region-year analysis.
Massachusetts's shall-issue-law dummy variable was improperly coded as "missing"
for 1999 and 2000 observations. Since Massachusetts did not have a shall-issue law, all
counties in the state should have a shall-issue dummy-variable value of zero for each year.
Similarly, the before- and after-trend variables for Massachusetts in 1999 and 2000 should
equal zero; instead, they were also improperly coded as "missing."
We also noticed that PW's shall-issue dummy coding implied that they considered
Idaho to have passed its shall-issue law in 1991, but in coding their year-by-year dummies
for use in their year-by-year analysis they treated Idaho as passing the law in 1990, which is
the date of passage that we have been using. See Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1215
tbl. 1. The Table we present as the "corrected" version of PW table 3a, see infra tbl.3a, has
not changed their coding of Idaho passing in 1991.
54. See infra tbl.3.
1393
HeinOnline -- 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1393 2002-2003
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
statistically significant declines. The bottom panel of Table 3,55 which corrects
the errors in PW table 3a, now reveals that the only statistically significant
results in the dummy model are the three increases in property crime, auto
theft, and larceny. PW described their PW table 3a spline results as follows:
"The change in trends is statistically significant at least at the ten-percent level
for all individual violent crime categories for the spline estimates, implying that
murder, rape, and robbery fall by over two percent per year during each
additional year that right-to-carry laws are in effect."'56 However, our corrected
estimates find that none of the estimates for the violent crime categories are
significant when using the spline model. In fact, the spline model does not
generate a significant effect for any crime category.
These serious data errors infect every regression presented in the PW
response. Consequently, researchers and policymakers should not rely on any
of the new regressions that PW present in their response.
55. See infra tbl.3.
56. Plassmann & Whitley, supra note 13, at 1344.
1394 [Vol. 55:1371
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CONCLUSION
It is now possible to clarify the existing differences between us and PW. 57
While we emphasized the severe selection-effect problem of estimating the
effects of concealed handguns by aggregating across all the adopting
jurisdictions, PW simply ignore this concern. When they contend that we have
"misread" our own results, it is because they cite the jurisdictionally aggregated
regression estimates that we showed were flawed and continue to pin their
more guns, less crime hypothesis on this flawed estimation approach. Indeed,
if one accepts our view on this point, one has to jettison virtually their entire
paper, which probably explains why they did not respond to the issue. PW
present twelve figures and thirteen tables in their paper that offer estimates of
the effect of concealed-carry laws on crime, and of these, every one but PW
table 6 58 and appendix table 4 59 is unreliable because they rely on the
discredited jurisdictional-aggregation assumption. Moreover, every new
regression on PW's extended county dataset is fatally flawed by coding errors
that conveniently support their thesis, so readers must be careful to disregard
every regression finding that PW ran (that is, everything from PW table 3 on
and PW figure 4 on).
PW charge that we have misread their results, but only because they
ignored our discussion of the dangers of aggregation so well documented in our
AD figures 3a through 3i6° and our AD tables 7 and 8.61 The bottom line is
that the best evidence suggests overall small increases in crime associated with
adoption of concealed-carry laws, but there are enough factors to counsel
caution in making strong conclusions. One such concern is the fact that the
most consistently strong results suggest increases in property crime, even
though the theoretical link between these laws and property-crime hikes is
obscure.
In the wake of some of the criticisms that we have leveled against the Lott
and Mustard thesis, John Lott appeared before a National Academy of Sciences
panel examining the plausibility of the more guns, less crime thesis and
presented them with a series of figures showing year-by-year estimates that
57. PW make a number of small points that are probably a distracting waste of time for
the readers. For example, PW take issue with our claim that the United States is exceptional
in its rate of lethal violence. We of course were referring to the advanced industrial
countries that one ordinarily considers to be the natural comparison group for the United
States, for which the claim is certainly true. PW note that a number of developing countries
have higher rates of lethal violence than the United States, but, in any event, the issue simply
has no bearing on what the impact of concealed-carry laws is on crime in the United States.
58. Plassmann & Whitley, supra note 13, at 1353 tbl.6.
59. Id. at 1349 tbl.4.
60. Ayres & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1246-54 figs.3a-3i.
61. Id. at 1242-44 tbls.7, 8a-8b.
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appeared to show sharp and immediate declines in crime with adoption of
concealed-carry laws. David Mustard even included these graphs in his initial
comment on the Donohue paper in the Brookings book that PW refer to
repeatedly in their current response. But Donohue privately showed Mustard as
well as the Brookings editors that the graphs were the product of coding errors
in creating the year-by-year dummies, and in the end Mustard conceded and
withdrew them from his comment on Donohue. Now PW respond to our paper
with an array of regressions that purport to support their thesis, but again are
utterly flawed by similar coding errors. We previously made no mention of the
initial National Academy of Sciences/Brookings comment error, since we know
how easy it is to make mistakes in doing this work. But for the second time
Lott and coauthors have put into the public domain flawed regression results
that happen to support their thesis, even though their results disappear when
corrected. Claiming we misread our results in the face of such obvious
evidence to the contrary and repeatedly bringing erroneous data into the public
debate starts suggesting a pattern of behavior that is unlikely to engender
support for the Lott and Mustard hypothesis. We feel confident concluding that
we have indeed shot down the more guns, less crime hypothesis. 62 Perhaps
PW can now assist in laying it to rest.
62. As emphasized in our original article, we are not necessarily replacing it with a
more guns, more crime result. Rather we emphasized that reasonable researchers could
embrace one of three possibilities: (1) Concealed-carry laws tend to increase crime;
(2) concealed-carry laws don't have any effect or at this date have an unknown effect; or
(3) concealed-carry laws have heterogeneous effects-increasing crimes in most
jurisdictions but decreasing it in some.
[Vol. 55:13711398
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